Table 3 Payoff matrix of the tripartite game
Participants | Investors | Enterprises | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Green projects \(\beta\) | Greenwashing projects \(1-\beta\) | |||
Regulatory authorities | Active supervision \(\gamma\) | Feedback \(\alpha\) | \(R_{i} - C_{i}\) | \(L_{e} + R_{i} - C_{i}\) |
\(V_{e} { + }R_{e} - \frac{1}{2}cg_{1}^{2}\) | \(V_{e} - L_{e} - F_{e}\) | |||
\(R_{r} - C_{r} - R_{i}\) | \(F_{e} + R_{r} - C_{r} - R_{i}\) | |||
Non-feedback \(1-\alpha\) | \(0\) | \(- L_{i}\) | ||
\(V_{e} - \frac{1}{2}cg_{1}^{2}\) | \(V_{e} - F_{e}\) | |||
\(- C_{r}\) | \(F_{e} - C_{r}\) | |||
Passive supervision \(1-\gamma\) | Feedback \(\alpha\) | \(- C_{i}\) | \(- C_{i} - L_{i}\) | |
\(V_{e} { + }R_{e} - \frac{1}{2}cg_{1}^{2}\) | \(V_{e}\) | |||
\(0\) | \(- L_{r} - L_{s}\) | |||
Non-feedback \(1-\alpha\) | \(0\) | \(- L_{i}\) | ||
\(V_{e} - \frac{1}{2}cg_{1}^{2}\) | \(V_{e}\) | |||
\(0\) | \(- L_{s}\) | |||