Table 2 Model parameters and descriptions
Parameters | Descriptions | Range |
|---|---|---|
\(\alpha\), \(1 - \alpha\) | Probability of the investors choosing feedback or non-feedback | \(0 \le \alpha \le 1\) |
\(\beta\), \(1 - \beta\) | Probability of the enterprises investing in green projects or greenwashing projects | \(0 \le \beta \le 1\) |
\(\gamma\), \(1 - \gamma\) | Probability of the regulatory authorities’ active supervision or passive supervision | \(0 \le \gamma \le 1\) |
\(V_{e}\) | Profit of the enterprises’ investment in green projects | \(V_{e} > 0\) |
\(R_{e}\) | Reputational benefits of enterprises from investors for green projects | \(R_{e} > 0\) |
\(C_{e}\) | Cost of enterprises for green projects | \(C_{e} > 0\) |
\(F_{e}\) | Penalty for enterprises carrying out greenwashing projects | \(F_{e} > 0\) |
\(g_{1}\) | Quality of green projects | \(g_{1} > 0\) |
\(R_{i}\) | Economic incentive for investor feedback | \(R_{i} > 0\) |
\(C_{i}\) | Cost of investors choosing feedback | \(C_{i} > 0\) |
\(L_{i}\) | Losses by investors investing in greenwashing projects | \(L_{i} > 0\) |
\(L_{e}\) | Compensation from enterprises to investors | \(L_{e} > 0\) |
\(R_{r}\) | Benefit of regulatory authorities from active supervision | \(R_{r} > 0\) |
\(C_{r}\) | Cost of regulatory authorities’ active supervision | \(C_{r} > 0\) |
\(L_{s}\) | Social welfare losses caused by greenwashing projects | \(L_{s} > 0\) |
\(L_{r}\) | The reputational losses of regulatory authorities’ passive supervision | \(L_{r} > 0\) |