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Table 3 local equilibrium points and their corresponding eigenvalue

From: Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC

 

\(\lambda_{1}\)

\(\lambda_{2}\)

\(\lambda_{3}\)

\((0,0,0)\)

\(\frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} )(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}( + )\)

\(\frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} )[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}( + )\)

\(I_{1} - C - I_{2}\)

\((0,0,1)\)

\(\frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} )(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }} - M_{1}\)

\(\frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} )[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }} - M_{2}\)

\(- (I_{1} - C - I_{2} )\)

\((0,1,0)\)

\(\frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} )(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}( + )\)

\(- \frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} )[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}\)

\(I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda N\)

\((1,0,0)\)

\(- \frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}\)

\(\frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}( + )\)

\(I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda N\)

\((1,1,0)\)

\(- \frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}\)

\(- \frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}\)

\(I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \lambda N\)

\((1,0,1)\)

\(M_{1} - \frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}( + )\)

\(\frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }} - M_{2}\)

\(- (I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda N)\)

\((0,1,1)\)

\(\frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} )(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }} - M_{1}\)

\(M_{2} - \frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} )[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}( + )\)

\(- (I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \frac{1}{2}\lambda N)\)

\((1,1,1)\)

\(M_{1} - \frac{{\alpha n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)(p_{2} - p_{1} )}}{{p_{2} }}( + )\)

\(M_{2} - \frac{{\alpha \eta n(p_{L} - p_{1} + m)[p_{3} - (1 - k)p_{1} ]}}{{p_{3} }}( + )\)

\(- (I_{1} - C - I_{2} + \lambda N)\)