Table 1 Table of model parameters/variables
Parameter/variable | Meaning |
|---|---|
\(x\) | Proportion of LIIs adopting strategy of rapacious quotation,\(0 \le x \le 1\) |
\(y\) | Proportion of SMIIs adopting strategy of imitative quotation,\(0 \le y \le 1\) |
\(z\) | Proportion of SD adopting strategy of tough supervision,\(0 \le z \le 1\) |
\(p_{1}\) | Price corresponding to illegal quotation of the institutional investor, including rapacious quotation and imitative quotation |
\(p_{2}\) | Price corresponding to fair quotation of LIIs |
\(p_{3}\) | Price corresponding to independent quotation of SMIIs |
\(p_{L}\) | Equilibrium price of new stocks in the secondary market, and \(p_{L} > p_{3} > p_{2} > p_{1}\) |
\(m\) | Sensitivity of issuance price to \(x\),\(m > 0\) |
\(k\) | Culling rate of high-price culling rule,\(0 < k < 1\) |
\(\alpha\) | Allocation rate for new stock of institutional investors,\(0 < \alpha < 1\) |
\(\eta\) | The ratio of SMIIs to LIIs in terms of financial budget |
\(M_{1}\) | Penalty for illegal LIIs under tough supervision, \(M_{1}\) is greater than the incremental benefits of LIIs’ illegal quotations |
\(M_{2}\) | Penalty for illegal SMIIs under tough supervision, \(M_{2}\) is greater than the incremental benefits of SMIIs’ illegal quotations |
\(C\) | Additional cost of SD under tough supervision |
\(I_{1}\) | rewards of SD under tough supervision |
\(I_{2}\) | rewards when SD supervises lightly but illegal quotations are not exposed |
\(\lambda\) | Sensitivity of exposure ratio to the proportion of the illegal quotation group,\(0 < \lambda < 1\) |
\(N\) | Penalties by superior when SD supervises lightly and there are illegal quotations being exposed |