Skip to main content

Table 8 Robustness results for bank level data

From: Regulatory constraint and small business lending: do innovative peer-to-peer lenders have an advantage?

 

Bank small business lending

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

 

SBLvol

SBLvol

SBLvol

SBLvol

Treated*DFA

− 0.453***

− 0.272***

− 0.275***

− 0.336***

 

(− 23.314)

(− 25.128)

(− 24.707)

(− 16.285)

Size

0.498***

0.677***

1.127***

1.056***

 

(30.373)

(12.388)

(12.021)

(10.885)

TRBCapital

0.389***

− 0.002

0.030

0.026

 

(6.389)

(− 0.067)

(0.855)

(0.753)

CoreCapital

− 0.001

0.028

− 0.010

− 0.003

 

(− 0.062)

(1.368)

(− 0.401)

(− 0.117)

CoreTier1

− 0.467***

− 0.034

− 0.069*

− 0.069*

 

(− 7.753)

(− 0.991)

(− 1.870)

(− 1.887)

Deposits

0.025***

0.006*

0.004

0.002

 

(8.696)

(1.709)

(1.199)

(0.573)

NPL

− 0.018***

− 0.009*

− 0.008

− 0.007

 

(− 3.345)

(− 1.729)

(− 1.519)

(− 1.347)

ROE

0.002

− 0.006**

− 0.005*

− 0.005*

 

(0.507)

(− 1.985)

(− 1.792)

(− 1.655)

ROA

0.024

0.074**

0.061*

0.054

 

(0.707)

(2.208)

(1.779)

(1.579)

Capital

0.108***

0.022

0.062***

0.060***

 

(8.085)

(1.241)

(2.800)

(2.691)

Bank FE

 

Yes

Yes

Yes

County FE

  

Yes

Yes

Year FE

   

Yes

Obs

11,039

10,922

10,906

10,906

Adj. R2

0.414

0.881

0.878

0.879

  1. Table 8 shows that by limiting the research period to one year before and after treatment, there is no change in banks' small lending activity and the effect of the Dodd-Frank Regulation is still significant. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by*,** and ***, respectively.t-statistics are presented in parentheses