Regulatory constraint and small business lending: do innovative peer-to-peer lenders have an advantage?

Financial Innovation

Table 11 Tests for successive shock

Additional controls
Small business lending
	Control of banks receiving TARP aid	Control of banks receiving SBLF funding	Control of TARP and SBLF
	(1)	(2)	(1)− (2) (3)
Dodd− Frank	− 0.346***	− 0.335***	− 0.116***
	(− 36.557)	(− 35.446)	(− 8.111)
TARP	0.041		− 0.011
	(1.160)		(− 0.372)
SBLF		0.107**	− 0.043
		(2.013)	(− 0.837)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	21,584	21,576	21,576
Adj. R²	0.876	0.885	0.898

Table 11 shows the result of additional tests for bank small business lending volume. In column 1, TARP is an indicator equal to one if a bank or its affiliated holding company participates in the TARP program and zero otherwise for years 2009–2012. In column 2, SBLF is an indicator equal to one if a bank or its affiliated holding company participates in the SBLF program and zero otherwise between 2009 and 2012. In column 3, all two potential successive shocks are controlled for. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by^*,^** and ^***, respectively.t-statistics are presented in parentheses