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Table 10 Robustness results for alternative P2P lending

From: Regulatory constraint and small business lending: do innovative peer-to-peer lenders have an advantage?

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

 

P2PSBL

P2PSBL

P2PSBL

Treated*DFA

0.559***

0.515***

0.612***

 

(8.664)

(5.952)

(4.737)

Population

0.023

− 6.220

− 5.910

 

(0.841)

(− 1.157)

(− 1.094)

Income

− 0.473**

− 1.351

− 1.279

 

(− 2.491)

(− 1.033)

(− 0.971)

Unemployment

0.047***

0.102

0.099

 

(3.430)

(1.263)

(1.221)

C3

− 0.000

0.102**

0.112**

 

(− 0.104)

(2.226)

(2.245)

HHI

0.445***

− 0.800

− 0.905

 

(3.193)

(− 0.448)

(− 0.497)

BRNUM

0.123**

− 3.612

− 3.958

 

(2.437)

(− 0.923)

(− 0.985)

DebtoIncome

0.046

0.251

0.240

 

(1.326)

(1.303)

(1.235)

Domdep

− 0.003

0.027

0.025

 

(− 0.321)

(0.260)

(0.226)

County FE

 

Yes

Yes

Year FE

  

Yes

Obs

732

594

594

Adj. R2

0.165

0.328

0.324

  1. Table 10 shows that by limiting the research period to one year before and after treatment, there is no change on alternative (P2P FinTech) lending for small businesses and the effect of Dodd-Frank Regulation is still significant. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and shown in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by*,** and ***, respectively.t-statistics are presented in parentheses