Bank loan information and information asymmetry in the stock market: evidence from China

Financial Innovation

Table 10 Relationship between PIN and overdue loans excluding disclosure

Variables	PIN
Variables	1	2	3	4
OL	0.0115**
OL	(2.55)
OL rate		0.0336***
OL rate		(3.26)
OL Tbank			0.0269**
OL Tbank			(2.53)
OL Nbank				0.0116**
OL Nbank				(2.55)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year \(\times\) industry-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-fixed effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted \(R^2\)	0.0690	0.0691	0.0691	0.0690
Obs.	26,845	26,845	26,845	26,845

This table reports the OLS results of the tests on the relationships between PIN and overdue loans in the subsample where news disclosure is excluded. It represents the results of the regression: \(PIN_{i,t}=\alpha +\beta _{1}\times Loan\_default_{i,t}+\sum \beta _{i}\times Control_{i,t}+\varepsilon _{i,t}\), where PIN is a measure for information asymmetry in the stock market. Variables for bad news in the loan market in this table are OL, OL rate, OL Tbank, and OL Nbank. The control variables in previous tables are included in the regressions, and the t-statistics reported are based on standard errors clustered by firm. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively