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Table 6 Key literature on policy and political issues of SB

From: Shadow banking: a bibliometric and content analysis

References Journal/conference Nature Main arguments/findings
Yang et al. (2019) Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Empirical Shadow banking has a negative influence on welfare at times of monetary policy shock. Coordinating leverage ratio regulations and monetary policies would help stabilize the financial system and decrease the size of shadow banking
Zhang and Wan (2017) Emerging Markets Finance and Trade Empirical Chinese economic activities need to be guided by a mix of policy instruments. The transition from quantitative policy tools to other price-based instruments will not be easy, but it will capture the monetary policy stances to a little extent, especially for the open market operations
Nesvetailova (2015) New Political Economy Theoretical Shadow banking results from regulative arbitration in the traditional banking system enhanced by the nationwide accounting, taxation, and banking rules. The administrative arbitration approaches towards shadow banking are useful but limited
Hou et al. (2018) International Review of Economics and Finance Empirical Political intervention negatively impacts the bank cost efficiency, which weakens the positive relationship between bank cost efficiency and shadow banking growth
Fève et al. (2019) Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control Empirical As the macroprudential policies only target the traditional banks and the sector leakage reduces their effectiveness, wider regulations addressing shadow credit may help stabilize the economy
Bryan et al. (2016) Review of International Political Economy Theoretical The shadow banking sector is not only a sector of erratic financial practice and a reason for financial fragility but also a sector of political and juridical innovation
Ban and Gabor (2016) Review of International Political Economy Theoretical Redistributing wealth on a large scale is a better solution to redress the economic structural imbalance than better regulations of shadow banks. Thus, the responsibility is mostly on the influencers of income inequality and not on the regulatory authority