Does access to credit reduce SMEs’ tax avoidance? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

Financial Innovation

Table 8 Effects of TRRRCs on corporate tax avoidance in 2015

	75% CCTF		CCTF		150% CCTF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(TRC\)	− 0.201*	− 0.261	− 0.252*	− 0.203*	− 0.215**	− 0.235**
	(0.117)	(0.171)	(0.139)	(0.113)	(0.095)	(0.010)
Polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample size	1326	2516	1734	3795	3182	5076
Panel B: Sharp RDD (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(SME\)	− 0.046**	− 0.044**	− 0.039***	− 0.040**	− 0.041***	− 0.038***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample size	1190	2641	1786	3810	2794	5822

\(TRC\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's bank loan raise after TRRRCs. \(SME\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's operation revenue was below the threshold of operation revenue. Columns (1) and (2) are based on 75% of CCTF bandwidth, Columns (3) and (4) use CCTF bandwidth, and Columns (5) and (6) use sample firms within 150% of CCTF bandwidth. The discontinuity estimates are based on local linear/quadratic regressions. Standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively