Skip to main content

Table 8 Effects of TRRRCs on corporate tax avoidance in 2015

From: Does access to credit reduce SMEs’ tax avoidance? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

  75% CCTF CCTF 150% CCTF
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 2SLS (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(TRC\) − 0.201* − 0.261 − 0.252* − 0.203* − 0.215** − 0.235**
  (0.117) (0.171) (0.139) (0.113) (0.095) (0.010)
Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Covariates No Yes Yes No No Yes
Sample size 1326 2516 1734 3795 3182 5076
Panel B: Sharp RDD (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(SME\) − 0.046** − 0.044** − 0.039*** − 0.040** − 0.041*** − 0.038***
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013)
Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Covariates No Yes Yes No No Yes
Sample size 1190 2641 1786 3810 2794 5822
  1. \(TRC\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's bank loan raise after TRRRCs. \(SME\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's operation revenue was below the threshold of operation revenue. Columns (1) and (2) are based on 75% of CCTF bandwidth, Columns (3) and (4) use CCTF bandwidth, and Columns (5) and (6) use sample firms within 150% of CCTF bandwidth. The discontinuity estimates are based on local linear/quadratic regressions. Standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively