Skip to main content

Table 6 Effects of TRRRCs on corporate tax avoidance: placebo tests

From: Does access to credit reduce SMEs’ tax avoidance? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

  Cutoff = −0.1 Cutoff = 0.15 Cutoff = −0.25 Cutoff = 0.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: 2SLS (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(TRC\) − 0.040 − 0.002 0.251 0.097 0.394 20.5 0.017 − 0.034
  (0.082) (0.077) (0.680) (0.392) (0.710) (66.115) (0.283) 0.182
Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Covariates No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Sample size 2653 4453 2463 4176 3727 5197 2618 4216
Panel B: Sharp RDD (dependent variable: \(BTD\))
\(SME\) − 0.009 − 0.000 − 0.017 − 0.011 0.014 0.022** − 0.003 0.002
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Polynomial Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Covariates No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Sample size 3575 3149 2535 4414 3078 4171 2673 4246
  1. Cutoff =  − 0.1, 0.15, − 0.25, 0.2 represent pseudo-cutoffs which are below or above the actual cutoff arbitrarily. \(TRC\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's bank loan raise after TRRRCs. \(SME\) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm's operation revenue was below the threshold of operation revenue. The discontinuity estimates are based on local linear/quadratic regressions. Standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively