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Table 4 The Origin of the Realized Effect in Social Media Information Spillover

From: The relative importance of competition to contagion: evidence from the digital currency market

 

Measurement

(−3,0)

(−1,0)

(0,0)

(0,1)

(0,3)

Regulation

Neg%

−.00019

.00022

.00033

.00018

.00317

−.00281*

−.00242**

−.00286**

−.00300*

.00031

−.00219

−.00112

−.00116

.00030

.00272

Exchange

Neg%

.00094

.00122***

.00115***

.00073

.00194**

.00005

.00057

0.00050

.00064

.00260*

−.0017

1.30E-06

−0.00003

.00022

.00108

Merchants

-Pos%

.00142

−.0007

−0.00071

−.00025

.00173

.00051

−.00191

−0.00171

−.00085

.00379

.00690**

.00244

0.00199

.00274

.00881**

Wallets

Neg%

−.00152***

−.00054**

−.00050**

−.00206***

−.00091**

−.00198***

−.00087**

−.00073*

−.00161**

.00019

−.00261**

−.00169**

−.00168**

−.00527**

−.00379*

Events

Neg%

−.00136

.00045

.00005

−.00290***

−.00351*

−.00129

−.00050

−.00095

−.00476***

−.00301

−.00574*

−.00472**

−.00505**

−.00520**

−.00298

Crime

Neg%

.00147**

.00018

.00028

.00030

−.00004

.00234**

.00038

.00067

.00060

.00168

.00128

.00013

.00037

−.00017

.00121

Investors

Neg%

.00022

.00033

.00059

−.00137

−.00094

−.00236

−.00091

−.00080

−.00340**

−.00394*

.00034

−.00074

−.00094

−.00319

−.00241

Funding

-Pos%

−.00255**

−.00031

.00025

.0008

.00172

−.00340

−.00260*

−.00188

−.00317

−.00174

−.00073

−.00010

−.00070

−.00248

−.00164

  1. Each information channel-to-time window pair generates three coefficient estimates for β3 in eq. 4. For each pair, the top number is \( \hat{\beta_3} \) with no interaction term in the model, the middle number is \( \hat{\beta_3} \) with only linear interaction term in the model, and the bottom number is \( \hat{\beta_3} \) with both linear and quadratic interaction terms in the model