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Table 8 The influence of firm prestige

From: Cash holdings, corporate governance, and acquirer returns

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

E-index

−0.483 (−1.64)

−1.206*** (−3.18)

−1.248*** (−3.35)

−1.209*** (−3.25)

−1.367*** (−3.24)

E-index × Excess Cash

−0.431** (−2.34)

−0.518*** (−2.91)

−0.825*** (−3.37)

−0.829*** (−3.34)

−0.827*** (−3.31)

E-index × Prestige

 

1.894*** (3.92)

1.833*** (3.97)

1.849*** (4.04)

1.937*** (3.51)

E-index × Excess Cash × Prestige

  

0.833*** (2.73)

0.836*** (2.71)

0.862** (2.39)

Prestige

−0.918 (−0.85)

−1.147 (−1.10)

−1.052 (−1.04)

−1.200 (−1.18)

−1.691 (−1.49)

Excess Cash

0.016 (0.06)

−0.025 (−0.10)

−0.030 (−0.12)

0.013 (0.05)

−0.156 (−0.57)

ln(Assets)

0.472 (1.04)

0.541 (1.23)

0.552 (1.26)

0.595 (1.35)

1.039** (2.08)

MtoB

−0.106 (−0.24)

−0.155 (−0.40)

−0.188 (−0.51)

−0.162 (−0.44)

−0.267 (−0.68)

Free Cash Flow

3.732 (0.77)

5.276 (1.08)

5.314 (1.10)

5.526 (1.16)

3.660 (0.78)

Leverage

2.318 (1.00)

2.310 (1.02)

2.639 (1.16)

2.647 (1.17)

1.190 (0.50)

Price Runup

−0.020* (−1.85)

−0.021** (−1.99)

−0.022** (−2.18)

−0.022** (−2.15)

−0.020* (−1.91)

Industry M&A

0.816 (1.14)

0.826 (1.17)

0.738 (1.05)

0.785 (1.11)

0.745 (1.01)

Relative Deal Size

0.874 (0.95)

0.859 (0.93)

0.829 (0.91)

1.100 (1.18)

1.303 (1.38)

HighTech

1.335 (1.11)

1.255 (1.07)

1.334 (1.15)

1.378 (1.16)

1.783 (1.44)

HighTech × Relative Deal Size

−7.919* (−1.84)

−7.827* (−1.84)

−7.594* (−1.79)

−7.873* (−1.84)

−7.314* (−1.69)

Private Target

−1.133 (−1.47)

−1.062 (−1.38)

−1.126 (−1.48)

−2.165** (−2.44)

−2.276** (−2.49)

Public Target

−3.958*** (−4.14)

−3.628*** (−3.92)

−3.727*** (−4.04)

−5.182*** (−4.57)

−5.556*** (−4.70)

Hostile Deal

1.024 (0.42)

1.409 (0.59)

1.312 (0.56)

1.286 (0.54)

1.241 (0.51)

Cash Only

1.137 (1.64)

1.059 (1.54)

1.092 (1.59)

−1.124 (−1.09)

−1.171 (−1.07)

Stock Only

0.948 (0.80)

0.696 (0.61)

0.700 (0.62)

−0.441 (−0.11)

−0.908 (−0.19)

Tender Offer

−0.162 (−0.13)

−0.012 (−0.01)

0.095 (0.08)

−1.160 (−0.88)

−0.960 (−0.71)

CEO Ownership

−0.058 (−0.39)

−0.023 (−0.16)

−0.034 (−0.23)

−0.042 (−0.29)

0.032 (0.24)

CEO Ownership Squared

0.003 (0.71)

0.002 (0.50)

0.002 (0.58)

0.003 (0.63)

0.001 (0.24)

ln(Board Size)

−3.589** (−2.36)

−3.819*** (−2.60)

−3.599** (−2.48)

−3.405** (−2.34)

−2.616 (−1.56)

Pct. of Ind. Directors

3.009 (1.46)

3.242 (1.58)

3.127 (1.53)

2.711 (1.38)

2.413 (1.18)

CEO-Chair

−0.457 (−0.58)

−0.405 (−0.52)

−0.292 (−0.37)

−0.283 (−0.36)

−0.312 (−0.40)

Private Target × Cash Only

   

2.826* (1.67)

2.250 (1.43)

Public Target × Cash Only

   

5.060*** (2.98)

5.651*** (3.04)

Private Target × Stock Only

   

1.731 (0.40)

1.985 (0.39)

Public Target × Stock Only

   

1.588 (0.36)

1.837 (0.36)

Intercept

7.510 (1.53)

6.100 (1.24)

4.518 (0.86)

3.699 (0.73)

−1.766 (−0.27)

Incorporation State Dummy

No

No

No

No

Yes

Adj. R2

0.089

0.110

0.118

0.126

0.146

N

545

545

545

545

545

  1. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARMM (−2,+2)) of bidders. Prestige is a measure of firm prestige, having a value of one if a bidder is listed on the S&P500 index or Fortune 500 list and zero otherwise. Models (1)-(5) are estimated for the weakest governance sub-group, defined as acquirers having below the median value of public pension fund ownership and above the median value of industry NPM. All models are estimated with calendar year dummy and industry fixed effects. In models (5), incorporation state dummy variables are added. Industry is defined at the Fama-French 48 industries. The numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All final variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and *denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively