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Table 7 Robustness tests

From: Cash holdings, corporate governance, and acquirer returns

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

CEO incentives

Board and leadership

CARMAR(−2, +2)

Block ownership

Sales expenses

G-index

Classified boards

E-index

−0.639** (−2.15)

−0.521* (−1.77)

−0.535* (−1.77)

−0.266 (−0.97)

−0.020 (−0.09)

  

E-index × Excess Cash

−0.481** (−2.48)

−0.471** (−2.54)

−0.406** (−2.22)

−0.339** (−2.21)

−0.298** (−2.11)

  

ln(G-index)

     

−1.344 (−1.16)

 

ln(G-index) × Excess Cash

     

−1.384** (−2.00)

 

Classified Board

      

−0.103 (−0.13)

Classified Board × Excess Cash

      

−1.164** (−2.34)

Excess Cash

0.154 (0.58)

0.107 (0.41)

0.048 (0.18)

−0.075 (−0.33)

−0.269 (−1.24)

3.124** (2.02)

0.892** (2.08)

ln(Assets)

−0.208 (−0.62)

0.180 (0.52)

0.277 (0.80)

0.185 (0.56)

0.160 (0.48)

0.244 (0.70)

0.244 (0.70)

MtoB

−0.159 (−0.37)

−0.098 (−0.23)

0.008 (0.02)

−0.447 (−1.15)

0.863* (1.94)

−0.120 (−0.27)

−0.102 (−0.22)

Free Cash Flow

2.010 (0.40)

1.989 (0.40)

2.038 (0.40)

0.096 (0.02)

1.760 (0.40)

2.690 (0.53)

1.307 (0.26)

Leverage

3.628 (1.62)

2.688 (1.18)

2.388 (1.06)

2.201 (1.27)

−0.286 (−0.14)

2.068 (0.91)

2.135 (0.95)

Price Runup

−0.014 (−1.25)

−0.017 (−1.56)

−0.004 (−0.36)

0.002 (0.16)

−0.020* (−1.82)

−0.019 (−1.61)

−0.018 (−1.61)

Industry M&A

0.792 (1.12)

0.772 (1.06)

0.724 (0.98)

1.018 (1.59)

0.823 (1.38)

0.775 (1.07)

0.792 (1.08)

Relative Deal Size

1.120 (1.26)

0.815 (0.89)

0.599 (0.63)

−0.971 (−0.91)

−0.520 (−0.50)

0.845 (0.90)

1.023 (1.12)

HighTech

1.260 (1.04)

1.390 (1.17)

1.142 (0.97)

−1.266 (−1.25)

−0.695 (−0.58)

1.450 (1.20)

1.299 (1.06)

HighTech × Relative Deal Size

−8.191** (−1.98)

−7.725* (−1.85)

−8.109* (−1.94)

−1.152 (−0.35)

2.260 (0.34)

−8.072* (−1.93)

−8.269* (−1.96)

Private Target

−0.929 (−1.19)

−1.184 (−1.53)

−1.456* (−1.86)

−0.895 (−1.30)

−1.452** (−2.31)

−1.221 (−1.58)

−1.235 (−1.60)

Public Target

−3.956*** (−3.94)

−3.908*** (−4.19)

−3.702*** (−3.93)

−2.078*** (−2.60)

−2.211*** (−3.01)

−3.920*** (−4.24)

−4.114*** (−4.44)

Hostile Deal

0.913 (0.38)

0.896 (0.37)

1.042 (0.41)

0.608 (0.35)

−1.572 (−1.00)

0.957 (0.39)

0.929 (0.38)

Cash Only

0.984 (1.37)

1.150 (1.64)

1.101 (1.60)

0.512 (0.80)

0.124 (0.21)

1.142 (1.61)

1.251* (1.76)

Stock Only

0.764 (0.64)

1.067 (0.89)

0.881 (0.72)

0.403 (0.37)

−0.312 (−0.29)

0.944 (0.77)

1.135 (0.93)

Tender Offer

−0.307 (−0.24)

−0.467 (−0.37)

−0.957 (−0.76)

−0.229 (−0.20)

−0.644 (−0.61)

−0.245 (−0.19)

−0.192 (−0.15)

CEO Ownership

−0.165 (−1.21)

−0.087 (−0.58)

−0.045 (−0.30)

0.047 (0.37)

0.207 (1.49)

−0.081 (−0.53)

−0.081 (−0.56)

CEO Ownership Squared

0.005 (1.34)

0.003 (0.83)

0.003 (0.62)

−0.002 (−0.52)

−0.007* (−1.70)

0.004 (0.85)

0.004 (0.91)

ln(Board Size)

 

−4.112*** (−2.70)

−4.419*** (−2.83)

−0.809 (−0.54)

−1.575 (−1.14)

−4.058** (−2.56)

−4.449*** (−2.73)

Pct. of Ind. Directors

 

−0.550 (−0.69)

−0.650 (−0.79)

−0.855 (−1.17)

−0.462 (−0.67)

−0.737 (−0.90)

−0.774 (−0.97)

CEO-Chair

 

2.664 (1.23)

3.292 (1.51)

1.908 (1.05)

−0.175 (−0.10)

2.819 (1.33)

2.781 (1.26)

Intercept

5.825* (1.76)

9.448** (2.28)

9.205** (2.14)

2.500 (0.62)

6.358 (1.58)

10.072** (2.06)

8.379* (1.94)

Adj. R2

0.076

0.089

0.070

0.034

0.066

0.079

0.082

N

548

545

545

577

606

545

545

  1. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of bidders using the market-adjusted returns (CARMAR(−2, +2)) in model (3) and the market model residuals (CARMM (−2,+2)) in other models. The results for the weakest governance sub-group are reported (the results for other sub-groups are summarized in Appendix: Table 10). The weakest governance sub-group is defined as acquirers having below the median value of public pension fund ownership and above the median value of industry NPM. CEO Incentives are measured with share ownership by top 5 executives and its squared term. Board structure is measured by the board size and the percentage of independent directors. Leadership structure is measured by CEO-Chair duality. Block Ownership is the percentage ownership by institutional block holders. Sales Expense is the industry median ratio of operating income divided by sales revenues, which is a measure of industry competition. G-index is the sum of 24 antitakeover provisions in Gompers et al. (2003). Classified Boards is an indicator variable for board classification. All models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and industry fixed effects. Industry is defined at the Fama-French 48 industries. The numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All final variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and *denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively