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Table 6 The interactive effect of excess cash, industry competition, and public pension fund ownership

From: Cash holdings, corporate governance, and acquirer returns

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

 

High Pension

Low Pension

High Pension

Low Pension

High Pension

Low Pension

High Pension

Low Pension

High Competition

High Competition

Low Competition

Low Competition

High Competition

High Competitive

Low Competition

Low Competition

E-index

−0.047 (−0.23)

−0.061 (−0.25)

−0.056 (−0.31)

−0.544** (−2.34)

−0.052 (−0.25)

−0.000 (−0.00)

0.006 (0.04)

−0.588** (−2.40)

E-index × Excess Cash

    

−0.134 (−0.79)

−0.185 (−1.23)

−0.026 (−0.22)

−0.343** (−2.12)

Excess Cash

    

−0.132 (−0.46)

−0.186 (−0.72)

−0.187 (−0.99)

0.229 (1.05)

ln(Assets)

−0.635*** (−2.75)

−0.442 (−1.59)

−0.344* (−1.82)

0.022 (0.10)

−0.530* (−1.87)

−0.200 (−0.58)

−0.226 (−1.12)

−0.235 (−0.90)

MtoB

0.463 (1.35)

0.433* (1.71)

0.630** (2.19)

0.008 (0.02)

0.499 (1.48)

0.493 (1.64)

0.621** (2.30)

−0.007 (−0.02)

Free Cash Flow

6.086 (1.30)

3.029 (0.92)

1.578 (0.47)

2.490 (0.57)

4.068 (0.84)

−0.216 (−0.06)

0.794 (0.24)

3.805 (0.83)

Leverage

2.098 (1.19)

1.224 (0.74)

2.872* (1.93)

2.738* (1.65)

1.410 (0.75)

0.396 (0.21)

1.586 (1.06)

2.610 (1.50)

Price Runup

−0.023*** (−3.06)

−0.007 (−1.05)

−0.014** (−2.23)

−0.019** (−2.41)

−0.026*** (−3.53)

−0.007 (−1.02)

−0.014** (−2.16)

−0.018** (−2.24)

Industry M&A

−0.292 (−0.49)

−0.143 (−0.25)

−0.829* (−1.71)

0.639 (1.06)

−0.515 (−0.84)

−0.015 (−0.02)

−0.711 (−1.44)

0.381 (0.62)

Relative Deal Size

1.815 (1.12)

0.738 (0.69)

−0.455 (−0.38)

1.946** (2.08)

2.108 (1.31)

0.829 (0.74)

−0.399 (−0.32)

1.908** (2.03)

HighTech

1.548* (1.97)

0.472 (0.53)

−1.145 (−1.64)

1.321 (1.30)

1.436* (1.84)

0.854 (0.85)

−1.181* (−1.67)

1.348 (1.45)

HighTech × Relative Deal Size

−6.584* (−1.83)

0.008 (0.00)

0.973 (0.38)

−9.614*** (−2.89)

−7.042* (−1.84)

−0.000 (−0.00)

0.340 (0.13)

−10.249*** (−3.01)

Private Target

−1.539*** (−2.77)

−0.722 (−1.08)

−0.692 (−1.38)

−0.982 (−1.52)

−1.478** (−2.55)

−0.938 (−1.36)

−0.853 (−1.64)

−1.092* (−1.67)

Public Target

−2.752*** (−3.32)

−3.126*** (−3.21)

−1.884*** (−2.75)

−4.037*** (−4.54)

−2.812*** (−3.23)

−3.915*** (−3.53)

−1.839*** (−2.63)

−4.111*** (−4.36)

Hostile Deal

−0.088 (−0.05)

−2.255 (−1.29)

0.422 (0.37)

1.005 (0.54)

−0.071 (−0.04)

−2.144 (−1.09)

0.553 (0.51)

0.496 (0.25)

Cash Only

0.746 (1.33)

0.022 (0.04)

0.699 (1.41)

0.657 (1.09)

0.894 (1.60)

0.302 (0.44)

0.635 (1.30)

1.047* (1.68)

Stock Only

−1.588 (−1.50)

−0.736 (−0.68)

0.494 (0.49)

0.150 (0.15)

−1.736 (−1.56)

−0.358 (−0.31)

0.467 (0.46)

0.441 (0.41)

Tender Offer

0.887 (0.78)

1.633 (1.19)

1.280 (1.42)

0.280 (0.24)

0.988 (0.82)

2.345 (1.57)

1.369 (1.48)

0.376 (0.32)

Intercept

1.916 (0.82)

4.093 (1.48)

1.085 (0.41)

3.118 (1.16)

1.015 (0.39)

4.126 (1.31)

0.623 (0.23)

5.670** (2.24)

Adj. R2

0.080

0.015

0.031

0.088

0.087

0.013

0.038

0.096

N

796

885

874

785

747

755

841

714

  1. The dependent variable is the market model adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CARMM (−2,+2)) of bidders. Two-way sorts are based on the median values of public pension fund ownership and industry NPM. All models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and industry fixed effects. Industry is defined at the Fama-French 48 industries. The numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics. All final variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and *denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively