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Table 4 Regression of bidder returns on antitakeover provisions and excess cash

From: Cash holdings, corporate governance, and acquirer returns

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

High Cash

Low Cash

E-index

−0.156 (−1.53)

−0.371*** (−2.75)

−0.152 (−1.38)

−0.522*** (−3.01)

0.260 (1.46)

−0.133 (−1.21)

−0.133 (−1.22)

E-index × After

 

0.526*** (2.71)

     

Excess Cash

  

−0.067 (−0.62)

  

−0.038 (−0.35)

 

E-index × Excess Cash

     

−0.162** (−2.34)

 

Excess CashALT

      

−0.041 (−0.38)

E-index × Excess CashALT

      

−0.158** (−2.27)

ln(Assets)

−0.346*** (−3.19)

−0.398*** (−3.78)

−0.285** (−2.27)

−0.324 (−1.55)

−0.083 (−0.36)

−0.313** (−2.45)

−0.311** (−2.43)

MtoB

0.436*** (3.03)

0.318*** (2.35)

0.405** (2.54)

0.230 (0.95)

0.426 (1.43)

0.392** (2.45)

0.393** (2.45)

Free Cash Flow

1.526 (0.80)

2.068 (1.12)

−0.138 (−0.07)

0.382 (0.14)

3.791 (0.89)

0.059 (0.03)

0.051 (0.02)

Leverage

1.461* (1.81)

1.244 (1.64)

1.037 (1.19)

1.946 (1.39)

−0.602 (−0.42)

1.142 (1.30)

1.135 (1.30)

Price Runup

−0.012*** (−3.01)

−0.008** (−2.20)

−0.011** (−2.58)

−0.006 (−0.79)

−0.026*** (−3.99)

−0.011*** (−2.62)

−0.011*** (−2.62)

Industry M&A

−0.245 (−0.93)

−0.168 (−0.64)

−0.294 (−1.07)

−0.099 (−0.21)

−0.351 (−0.76)

−0.309 (−1.13)

−0.308 (−1.12)

Relative Deal Size

1.120** (2.01)

1.015* (1.76)

1.167** (2.10)

−0.284 (−0.31)

0.870 (1.02)

1.161** (2.10)

1.162** (2.10)

HighTech

0.323 (0.75)

0.390 (0.97)

0.464 (1.11)

1.306* (1.95)

−1.046 (−1.49)

0.428 (1.03)

0.430 (1.03)

HighTech × Relative Deal Size

−3.228* (−1.72)

−3.593** (−2.08)

−4.033** (−2.12)

−3.964 (−1.24)

−0.982 (−0.31)

−3.918** (−2.06)

−3.921** (−2.06)

Private Target

−0.887*** (−2.94)

−0.970*** (−3.24)

−1.006*** (−3.32)

−0.986* (−1.92)

−0.901** (−2.03)

−0.993*** (−3.26)

−0.993*** (−3.26)

Public Target

−2.910*** (−6.88)

−2.891*** (−6.80)

−3.154*** (−7.05)

−2.860*** (−4.90)

−4.012*** (−5.23)

−3.135*** (−7.04)

−3.135*** (−7.04)

Hostile Deal

0.071 (0.09)

0.009 (0.01)

0.003 (0.00)

0.031 (0.03)

0.694 (0.65)

0.006 (0.01)

0.007 (0.01)

Cash Only

0.535* (1.95)

0.581** (2.18)

0.690** (2.41)

0.924* (1.80)

0.600 (1.42)

0.694** (2.42)

0.694** (2.42)

Stock Only

−0.508 (−0.96)

−0.540 (−1.04)

−0.330 (−0.60)

−0.762 (−1.06)

0.601 (0.60)

−0.356 (−0.65)

−0.357 (−0.65)

Tender Offer

1.053* (1.87)

1.043* (1.86)

1.328** (2.28)

0.546 (0.76)

2.411** (2.34)

1.330** (2.29)

1.330** (2.29)

Intercept

3.566*** (2.60)

3.090* (1.86)

3.546** (2.36)

2.311 (0.77)

3.897 (1.07)

3.713** (2.44)

3.693** (2.43)

Adj. R2

0.050

0.050

0.056

0.068

0.067

0.057

0.057

N

3,340

3,340

3,057

1,222

1,184

3,057

3,057

  1. The dependent variable is the market model cumulative abnormal return (CARMM (−2,+2)) of the bidders. E-index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). After equals to 1 if the deal is announced after year 2001 and 0, otherwise. Excess Cash and Excess Cash ALT are cash holdings net of the normal cash level estimated with the fixed-effect model (1) and (3) in Table 2, respectively. In model (3) and (4), we divided the sample into High (Low) Cash sub-groups based on the sample median value of excess cash. All models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and industry fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-stats. All final variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and *denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively